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INTRODUCTION

The American system of justice provides extensive safeguards for the
accused defendant in a criminal trial because the defendant's life or liberty
is in jeopardy.' Traditionally, there has been more concern with the possibility of an innocent person being unjustly convicted than with allowing a
guilty person to go free.2 An accused person, therefore, is presumed innocent until proven guilty.' In order to rebut this presumption of innocence,
the prosecution must prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.4 The elements of the crime may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. 5 The judge instructs the jury on the law after the
prosecution and defense have each presented their case.6 An important
reason for the instructions is to clarify the law for the jurors so that they
will be less likely to convict an innocent person.7
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (due process, protection against double jeopardy, accused cannot be forced to testify against self); U.S. CONST. amend. VI (speedy trial, impartial jury, right to confront witnesses, right to counsel).
2. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (basic
American value judgment that it is better to let guilty go free than to convict innocent); W.
LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 8, at 46 (1972) (public must know innocent not
convicted for criminal law to maintain its ethical force); C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EviDENCE § 341, at 798 (2d ed. 1972) (societal belief that guilty should go free rather than
innocent be found guilty).
3. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 2.01 (Vernon 1974) (presumption of innocence);
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.03 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) (person arrested and
indicted presumed innocent); W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 8, at 44 (1972)
(underlying tenet of American law requires prosecution to prove guilt). A foundation for a
fair trial under the American criminal justice system is the presumption of innocence. See
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976).
4. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 2.01 (Vernon 1974) (proof beyond a reasonable
doubt required for each element); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.03 (Vernon Supp.
1982-1983) (no conviction unless every element proved beyond a reasonable doubt); W.
LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 8, at 53 (1972) (accused assumed innocent means
prosecution has burden of production and burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt).
5. See, e.g., Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954) (circumstantial evidence
intrinsically same as direct evidence to meet' standard of proof); Hankins v. State, 646
S.W.2d 191, 199 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (Opinion on State's Motion for Rehearing) (circumstantial and direct evidence have equal ptobative value to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt); W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 8, at 44 (1972) (either direct or circumstantial evidence meets burden of proof).
6. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.14 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) (judge required to instruct jury on law in all felony cases and misdemeanor cases tried by jury). The
judge must also apply the law to the particular facts of the case. See Didion v. State, 625
S.W.2d 436, 438 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, pet. ref'd).
7. See, e.g., Schiesel v. S.Z. Pol Realty Co., 142 A. 812, 815 (Conn. 1928) (function of
instruction to guide jury toward just verdict); White v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 149
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The United States Supreme Court, reiterating the position taken by all
jurisdictions,8 has found that the "Due Process Clause protects the accused
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged."9 While
the Supreme Court has never explicitly held an instruction on reasonable
doubt to be necessary,' ° it may be concluded that a jury instruction on
"beyond a reasonable doubt" is required.'" In an attempt to clarify concepts for jurors, and as a means of protecting the defendant's right to a fair
trial, courts have given other instructions to the jury, including an instruction on circumstantial evidence. 2
The Supreme Court, however, echoing concerns of legal scholars and
the judiciary on juror misunderstanding, held in Holland v. United
States, '"that when a proper instruction on the reasonable doubt standard

S.W.2d 375, 377 (Mo. 1941) (jury guidance toward just result main purpose of instruction);
Texas Gen. Indem. Co. v. Welch, 595 S.W.2d 205, 207 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (instruction's purpose to help jury correctly decide disputed fact questions).
8. See, e.g., State v. Turner, 375 P.2d 567, 568 (Ariz. 1962) (conviction in criminal trial
requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt); People v. Gentry, 65 Cal. Rptr. 235, 238 (1968)
(prosecution must prove every element of crime beyond a reasonable doubt); State v. Moore,
435 S.W.2d 8, 12 (Mo. 1968) (state must prove case beyond a reasonable doubt). Prior to In
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970), the United States Supreme Court frequently referred
to the reasonable doubt standard of proof, but never held it a constitutional requirement
because all jurisdictions required proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases. See
W. LAFAVE & A. SCOT-r, CRIMINAL LAW § 8, at 46 (1972).
9. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (juvenile court cases also subject to proof
beyond a reasonable doubt). The reasonable doubt standard was explicitly given constitutional stature. See id at 365.
10. Cf. Dunbar v. United States, 156 U.S. 185, 200 (1895) (court only required to instruct that reasonable doubt not an unreasonable one). The Dunbar holding implies a required instruction. See id at 200. Opinions of the United States Supreme Court have often
indicated an assumption that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required
in criminal cases. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) (proof beyond reasonable
doubt presumed requirement); see also Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 254 (1910) (jury
instruction correct since prosecution must convince jury of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt).
It. See, e.g., Schneider v. United States, 192 F.2d 498, 503 (9th Cir. 1951) (error for
court not to properly instruct on reasonable doubt), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 914 (1952); TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.14 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) (judge must instruct jury on
law); I E. DEVITT & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE & INSTRUCTIONS § 8.02, at

245 (3d ed. 1977) (court must instruct jury on all vital questions of law including reasonable
doubt). The law requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt for all elements of the crime. See
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
12. See, e.g., Nilsson v. State, 477 S.W.2d 592, 598 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (insanity);
McDonald v. State, 631 S.W.2d 237, 240 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, no pet.) (manslaughter); Bueno v. State, 630 S.W.2d 333, 335 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, pet.
refd) (self-defense).
13. 348 U.S. 121 (1954).
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is given, a circumstantial evidence instruction is not needed. 4 In most
federal courts' 5 and many state jurisdictions' 6 the proper instruction includes a definition of "reasonable doubt."' 7 The Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals recently followed Holland in Hankins v. State. 8 The Texas court
reasoned that a circumstantial evidence instruction was confusing to the
jury because it incorrectly implied that there was a standard of proof for
circumtantial evidence different from that of "beyond a reasonable
doubt."' 9 Texas, however, is one of the few jurisdictions that does not
provide a definition of reasonable doubt to be given to jurors.2 °
Circumstantial evidence and reasonable doubt instructions are distinct
concepts, yet they overlap in this discussion because courts have considered the concepts simultaneously. 2' The courts have held that when a
proper instruction on reasonable doubt is given, a circumstantial evidence
instruction is improper. 22 This comment proposes that a proper instruc-

14. See id at 139-40. The circumstantial evidence instruction was found to confuse the
jury. See id at 139-40.
15. See, e.g., United States v. Wilkerson, 691 F.2d 425, 427-28 n.3 (8th Cir. 1982) (used
"hesitate to act" definition); United States v. Drake, 673 F.2d 15, 20 (1st Cir. 1982) ("hesitate
to act" definition preferred); United States v. Breedlove, 576 F.2d 57, 58 (5th Cir. 1978)
(reasonable doubt defined as one based on "reason and common sense").
16. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 152 N.W.2d 426, 431 (Iowa 1967) (reasonable doubt
defined correctly); State v. Henderson, 547 S.W.2d 141, 143 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) ("reasonable doubt does not mean beyond a shadow ..
"); Hardin v. State, 355 S.W.2d 105, 108
(Tenn. 1962) (reasonable doubt arises from uncertainty concerning guilt).
17. See Hankins v. State, 646 S.W.2d 191, 201 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (Opinion on
State's Motion for Rehearing) (Miller, J., concurring and dissenting) (nine federal circuits
and majority of states permit or require definition of "reasonable doubt").
18. 646 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (Opinion on State's Motion for Rehearing).
19. See id at 199. ("reasonable hypothesis" phrase invites juror confusion concerning
standard of proof).
20. Compare Young v. State, 648 S.W.2d 2, 3-4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (reasonable
doubt definition neither approved nor prohibited by Texas Court of Criminal Appeals) and
Pigg v. State, 162 Tex. Crim. 521, 523, 287 S.W.2d 673, 674 (1956) (reasonable doubt does
not need definition) with Merritt v. Commonwealth, 386 S.W.2d 727, 729 (Ky. 1965) (reasonable doubt defined as substantial and real doubt) and State v. Hester, 246 S.E.2d 83, 84
(N.C. Ct. App. 1978) (reasonable doubt is one "based on reason and common sense") and
State v. Pam, 635 P.2d 766, 768 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981) ("doubt for which reason based upon
evidence exists" defines reasonable doubt).
21. See Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 139-40 (1954) (circumstantial evidence
instruction given with reasonable doubt instruction); Hankins v. State, 646 S.W.2d 191, 197
(Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (Opinion on State's Motion for Rehearing) (proper instruction on
reasonable doubt given with circumstantial evidence charge).
22. See Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 139-40 (1954) (circumstantial evidence
instruction improper when jury properly instructed on reasonable doubt); Hankins v. State,
646 S.W.2d 191, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (Opinion on State's Motion for Rehearing) (as
long as proper instruction on reasonable doubt given circumstantial evidence charge
unnecessary).
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tion on reasonable doubt should include a definition of reasonable doubt.
As a foundation for this proposition, the comment will trace the development and decline of the circumstantial evidence instruction and evolution
of the definition of reasonable doubt, again two separate, yet overlapping,
concepts. An interdisciplinary analysis will focus on juror comprehension
of the reasonable doubt standard of proof and the instructions which convey this standard. Based on this analysis, the comment will recommend a
proposed definition of "reasonable doubt" that should be required in all

Texas criminal cases.
II.
A.

CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

Difference Between Circumstantial and Direct Evidence

The elements of a crime may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence.23 An example of direct evidence of a homicide is testimony from a
witness that he saw the defendant stab the victim with a knife.24 Circumstantial evidence for this same crime would be testimony that the witness
saw the defendant standing over the body holding a bloody knife.2 5 The
main distinction between circumstantial and direct evidence is the inferential process involved.26 Circumstantial evidence, unlike direct evidence,
requires at least one more inferential step from the fact to which the witness testified and the main fact needed to be established.2 7 While circum-

23. See, e.g., Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954) (same probative value
for circumstantial and direct evidence); Crocker v. State, 573 S.W.2d 190, 207 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1978) (burden of proof same whether met by circumstantial or direct evidence); W.
LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 8, at 46 n.14 (1972) (circumstantial or direct evidence meets burden of proof).
24. See C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 185, at 435 (2d ed. 1972). Concrete
objects, including documents are also direct evidence. See id at 435.
25. See Note, The CircumstantialEvidence Charge in Texas Criminal Cases: A Retrograde Doctrine, 55 TEXAS L. REV. 1255, 1255 (1977) (classic example of circumstantial evidence); see also Hankins v. State, 646 S.W.2d 191, 203 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (Opinion on
State's Motion for Rehearing) (Onion, J., dissenting) (citing Shakespeare's Macbeth, Act 2,
scene 2 (blood smeared on grooms' faces by Lady Macbeth circumstantial evidence of
grooms' guilt)).
26. See, e.g., Richardson v. State, 600 S.W.2d 818, 823 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (direct
evidence directly proves ultimate fact; circumstantial evidence directly proves another fact
which is basis for inference to prove ultimate fact); Oliver v. State, 551 S.W.2d 346, 350
(Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (circumstantial evidence shows minor fact which proves main fact
directly); C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 185, at 435 (2d ed. 1972) (direct evidence
requires one-step inferential process, circumstantial requires two steps).
27. See C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 185, at 435 (2d ed. 1972). In direct evidence testimony the only inference needed is that the witness made a true statement. See id.
at 435. For example, in witness testimony stating "I saw Harold stab Emily" the juror must
infer only that the witness is telling the truth. See id. at 435. Circumstantial evidence requires an inference from one fact to the truth of another fact which would prove a proposi-
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stantial evidence remains distinct from direct evidence, 28 courts have
considered their inferential processes functionally equivalent when the
facts proved by circumstantial evidence are so closely related to the main
fact that the only logical conclusion drawn is that the main fact itself is
proved.29
Circumstantial and direct evidence, however, are both subject to the
same standard of proof.3° Confusion over the standard applicable to circumstantial evidence has been fostered in Texas by the test traditionally
used to measure sufficiency of circumstantial evidence. 3' The test's focus
on excluding every hypothesis except guilt suggests a different standard of
proof.32

tion. See id.at 435. For example, witness testimony stating "I saw Harold standing over
Emily's body holding a bloody knife" requires the juror to infer not only that the witness is
telling the truth, but also that because Harold had the bloody knife he stabbed Emily. See
id.
at 435. Circumstantial evidence is, therefore, at least one inferential step farther removed
from the main fact (Harold stabbed Emily) than is direct evidence. See id.at 435. In direct
or circumstantial evidence the factual accuracy of the witness's statement itself may be in
question. See id at 435. The witness may be lying. See I F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL EviDENCE § 6, at 5 (13th e4, 1972). The unreliability of eyewitness testimony may be due to any
of several factors affecting the witness's perception or memory, including features in the
original situation (such as viewing conditions), the eyewitness's own characteristics (including expectations held before the event), memory distortion or decay over time, and factors at
the time the witness is asked to recall (such as methods of questioning). See Penrod, Loftus,
& Winkler, The Reliability of Eyewitness Testimony.- A Psychological Perspective, in THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM 157-58 (N. Kerr & R. Bray 1982).
28. See 1 F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 6, at 4 (13th ed. 1972).
29. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. State, 617 S.W.2d 693, 695 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (circumstantial evidence instruction not needed if facts proved by circumstantial evidence so close to
main fact that circumstantial evidence becomes equivalent to direct evidence); Frazier v.
State, 576 S.W.2d 617, 619 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) ("close juxtaposition rule" equates circumstantial and direct evidence since facts as basis for inference so similar); Chapin v. State,
167 Tex. Crim. 390, 393, 320 S.W.2d 341, 343 (1958) (refusal to give circumstantial evidence
instruction not error when only one conclusion logically possible).
30. See, e.g., Osborn v. State, 154 N.E. 865, 866 (Ind. 1927) (rule that state must prove
crime beyond reasonable doubt applies to verdicts supported by direct or circumstantial
evidence); Crocker v. State, 573 S.W.2d 190, 207 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (standard of proof
"beyond a reasonable doubt" whether elements of offense proved by circumstantial or direct
evidence); W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 8, at 46 n.14 (1972) (circumstantial or
direct evidence meets burden of proof); cf. State v. Buckingham, 134 A.2d 568, 571 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1957) (if case relying solely on circumstantial evidence creates reasonable inference of innocence, presumption of innocence maintained).
31. See, e.g., Barnes v. State, 41 Tex. 342, 344 (1874) (every reasonable hypothesis other
than guilt must be excluded); Moore v. State, 532 S.W.2d 333, 337 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976)
(test is exclusion of "every reasonable hypothesis other than guilt"); Lewis v. State, 654
S.W.2d 483, 488 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, rev. ref'd) ("every reasonable hypothesis other
than guilt

. . .

excluded").

32. Compare Bryant v. State, 574 S.W.2d 109, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (conviction
on proof beyond a reasonable doubt; in"circumstantial evidence case, upon proof excluding
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History of the CircumstantialEvidence Instruction Priorto Hankins

Although direct and circumstantial evidence have equal probative
value, 33 circumstantial evidence generally was distrusted by the public as
grounds for convicting a defendant.3 4 In an attempt to give the defendant
the best possible protection, courts gave juries an instruction on circumstantial evidence." In 1850, Massachusetts adopted the "Webster charge"
to instruct the jury on the sufficiency of evidence needed to convict by
circumstantial evidence. 36 After adoption of the charge by Texas courts in
all other hypotheses except ...guilt.") and Bonds v. State, 573 S.W.2d 528, 533 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1978) (circumstances must "exclude every other reasonable hypothesis except ...
guilt" for conviction on circumstantial evidence) with Crocker v. State, 573 S.W.2d 190, 207
(Tex. Crim. App. 1978) ("beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof for direct and circumstantial evidence cases). This apparent contradiction may be due also to the confusion
promoted by the wording of the circumstantial evidence charge: "[The circumstances] must
exclude, to a moral certainty, every other reasonable hypothesis except the defendant's guilt;
and unless they do so, beyond a reasonable doubt, you will find the defendant not guilty."
STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY CHARGES § 0.01, at 3 (1975).
33. See, e.g., Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954) (circumstantial and
direct evidence no different in probative value); Hankins v. State, 646 S.W.2d 191, 198 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1983) (Opinion on State's Motion for Rehearing) (general recognition circumstantial and direct evidence equivalent probative value); I J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EviDENCE § 26, at 401 (3d ed. 1940) (psychology and logic mandate equivalent weight for
circumstantial and direct evidence). "In both instances, a jury is asked to weigh the chances
that the evidence correctly points to guilt against the possibility of inaccuracy or ambiguous
inference. In both, the jury must use its experience with people and events in weighing the
probabilities." Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954).
34. See Note, The CircumstantialEvidence Charge in Texas Criminal Cases.- A Retrograde Doctrine, 55 TEXAS L. REV. 1255, 1256 (1977). Four main criticisms have been raised:
1) less accuracy, 2) past injustices due to conviction by circumstantial evidence, 3) once
created, jurors defend unjustified inferences from circumstantial evidence, and 4) jurors may
make hasty inferences to convict in sensational or gruesome cases. See id.at 1257.
35. See, e.g., Ellis v. State, 551 S.W.2d 407, 412 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (error to refuse
circumstantial evidence charge when case grounded entirely on circumstantial evidence);
Ransonette v. State, 550 S.W.2d 36, 43 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (circumstantial evidence
instruction needed when case based wholly on circumstantial evidence); Armstrong v. State,
542 S.W.2d 119, 122 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (circumstantial evidence charge required); see
also Hankins v. State, 646 S.W.2d 191, 207 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (Opinion on State's
Motion for Rehearing) (Onion, J., dissenting) (defendant must be protected from jury
speculation).
36. See Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 295, 313, 318-20 (1850), cited in
Henderson v. State, 14 Tex. 503, 514 (1855). The charge states:
In order to warrant a conviction of a crime on circumstantial evidence each fact necessary to the conclusion sought to be established must be proved by competent evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt; all the facts (that is, the facts necessary to the conclusion)
must be consistent with each other and with the main fact sought to be proved; and the
circumstances, taken together, must be of a conclusive nature, leading, on the whole, to
a satisfactory conclusion, and producing in effect a reasonable and moral certainty that
the accused and no other person committed the offense charged.
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38
1855, 3 Texas steadfastly required such an instruction.

Recent Texas cases prior to 1983 have reiterated the traditional Texas
position that when a case is based entirely on circumstantial evidence, a
circumstantial evidence instruction is needed 39 and the judge, upon the
defendant's request, is required to give the charge to the jury." The Texas
jury charge on circumstantial evidence has evolved into the following:
You are instructed that in this case the state relies on circumstantial
evidence for a conviction. In order to warrant a conviction of a crime
on circumstantial evidence, each fact necessary to the conclusion
sought to be established must be proved by competent evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt; all the facts (that is, the facts necessary to
the conclusion) must be consistent with each other and, taken together, must be of a conclusive nature, leading on the whole to a satisfactory conclusion and producing, in effect, a reasonable and moral
certainty that the accused, and no other person, committed the offense
charged. But in such cases it is not sufficient that the circumstances
coincide with, account for, and therefore render probable the guilt of
the defendant. They must exclude, to a moral certainty, every other
reasonable hypothesis except the defendant's guilt; and unless they do
a reasonable doubt, you will find the defendant not
so, beyond
41
guilty.

Henderson v. State, 14 Tex. 503, 514 (1855). The original "Webster charge" may be found
scattered throughout the holding. See Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 295,
313, 318-20 (1850). Mid-nineteenth century courts across the country adopted this charge.
See Note, The Circumstantial Evidence Charge in Texas Criminal Cases: A Retrograde Doctrine, 55 TEXAS L. REV. 1255, 1258 (1977).
37. See Henderson v. State, 14 Tex. 503, 514 (1855) (adopting "Webster charge").
38. See, e.g., Flores v. State, 489 S.W.2d 901, 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (must exclude
every reasonable hypothesis except guilt); Burrell v. State, 18 Tex. 713, 735 (1857) (jury
needs circumstantial evidence instruction when case based entirely on circumstantial evidence); Hunt v. State, 7 Tex. Ct. App. 212, 235 (1879) (facts supported only by circumstantial evidence must be "absolutely incompatible w4h the innocence of the accused, and
incapable of explanation upon any other reasonable hypothesis than that of guilt").
39. See, e.g., Shippy v. State, 556 S.W.2d 246, 250 (Tex. Crim. App.) (circumstantial
evidence instruction not required for nonessential issues supported only by circumstantial
evidence), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 935 (1977); Ransonette v. State, 550 S.W.2d 36, 43 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1977) (circumstantial evidence charge required when case based entirely on circumstantial evidence); Armstrong v. State, 542 S.W.2d 119, 122 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976)
(circumstantial evidence charge needed).
40. Compare Ellis v. State, 551 S.W.2d 407, 412 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (error in refusing circumstantial evidence charge when needed since case based wholly on circumstantial
evidence) with Mills v. State, 508 S.W.2d 823, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (no reversible
error for failure to give circumstantial evidence instruction when not requested or needed).
41. STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY CHARGES § 0.01, at 3
(1975); see P. McCLUNG, JURY CHARGES FOR TEXAS CRIMINAL PRACTICE 260 (1981)...
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There were two exceptions to the traditionally-held requirement for a
circumstantial evidence charge.42 First, knowledge and intent, mental elements of a crime, cannot be actually demonstrated by direct evidence. 43 A
cautionary jury instruction on circumstantial evidence, therefore, was not
needed when knowledge or intent were the only elements proved by circumstantial evidence. 44 Secondly, the "close juxtaposition" rule states that
the circumstantial evidence charge is unnecessary when facts proved by
circumstantial evidence are so closely related to the main fact probative of
the defendant's guilt that only one logical inference is possible concerning
the defendant's guilt.45
Although recent Texas cases prior to 1983 have upheld the traditional
position requiring a circumstantial evidence instruction, there was growing
concern within the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals on whether the circumstantial evidence instruction itself was needed.46 Strong dissents ar-

42. Compare Mauldin v. State, 628 S.W.2d 793, 796 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (charge not
needed when intent only element proved by circumstantial evidence) with Landry v. State,
156 Tex. Crim. 350, 355, 242 S.W.2d 381, 384 (1951) (charge unnecessary when close juxtaposition rule applies). There had been a third exception allowing the principal's charge to
substitute for the circumstantial evidence charge in aiding and abetting cases. See Note, The
Circumstantial Evidence Charge in Texas Criminal Cases. A Retrogade Doctrine, 55 TEXAS

L. REV. 1255, 1273 (1977). However, the law returned to its former position that the principal's charge was not an adequate substitute for the circumstantial evidence charge. See
Ransonette v. State, 550 S.W.2d 36, 42 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
43. See Note, The CircumstantialEvidence Charge in Texas Criminal Cases: A Retro-

gade Doctrine, 55 TEXAS L. REV. 1255, 1266 (1977) (recognition that only logical possibility
to directly prove mental processes by circumstantial evidence since mental processes themselves not observable). If a defendant confesses his knowledge or intent, however, the confession is considered direct evidence of the mental process. See id at 1266.
44. See, e.g., Mauldin v. State, 628 S.W.2d 793, 796 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (instruction
unnecessary if intent only element proved by circumstantial evidence); Steam v. State, 571
S.W.2d 177, 178 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (circumstantial evidence charge unnecessary when
intent only element proved by circumstantial evidence); Love v. State, 627 S.W.2d 457, 458
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no pet.) (circumstantial evidence charge not needed if
mens rea only element proved by circumstantial evidence).
45. See, e.g., Pyeatt v. State, 462 S.W.2d 952, 953 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (circumstantial evidence charge unnecessary when main facts so closely related); Byrd v. State, 435
S.W.2d 508, 510 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968) (facts proved by circumstantial evidence in close
juxtaposition, therefore circumstantial evidence charge not needed); Chapin v. State, 167
Tex. Crim. 390, 392, 320 S.W.2d 341, 343 (1958) (close juxtaposition rule used). Compare
Landry v. State, 156 Tex. Crim. 350, 355, 242 S.W.2d 381, 384 (1951) (close juxtaposition
rule applied) with Coleman v. State, 530 S.W.2d 823, 827 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (Roberts,
J., dissenting) (abolish close juxtaposition rule).
46. See Richardson v. State, 600 S.W.2d 818, 828 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (Daily, J.,
dissenting) (time for Texas to join modem trend abolishing circumstantial evidence instruction); Galvan v. State, 598 S.W.2d 624, 632 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(court should re-evaluate position requiring circumstantial evidence instruction).
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gued that the charge was confusing and should be abolished.4 7
C. CircumstantialEvidence Instruction Abolished in Many Jurisdictions
In 1954, the United States Supreme Court abolished the circumstantial
evidence charge in Hollandv. United States.48 The Court found that "the
better rule is that where the jury is properly instructed on the standard of
reasonable doubt, such an additional instruction on circumstantial evidence is confusing and incorrect."4 9 Nationwide, courts have followed the
trend established by Holland; most lower federal courts have abolished the
circumstantial evidence charge 5' and twenty-one states have also followed
Holland5l
D. Texas Abolishes Requirementfor CircumstantialEvidence Instruction
in Hankins v. State
1. Holding in Hankins
In Hankins v. State, 2 the defendant was convicted of burglarizing a
building on the basis of circumstantial evidence. 53 On rehearing, the
47. See Richardson v. State, 600 S.W.2d 818, 827 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (Dally, J.,
dissenting) (United States Supreme Court opposes circumstantial evidence charge); Galvan
v. State, 598 S.W.2d 624, 633 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (failure to
abolish convoluted charge fosters unintelligible decisions).
48. 348 U.S. 121, 139-40 (1954).
49. Id at 139-40. The Court reiterated that circumstantial and direct evidence are
equally probative. They went on to say that a court could demand no more than that the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt be met. See id at 140.
50. See, e.g., Taglianetti v. United States, 398 F.2d 558, 568 (Ist Cir. 1968) (quoted
Holland rule), aff'd, 394 U.S. 316 (1969); United States v. Botsch, 364 F.2d 542, 550 (2d Cir.
1966) (charge proper according to Holland standard), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 937 (1967); Bryant v. United States, 252 F.2d 746, 748 (5th Cir. 1958) (followed Holland rule in refusing
circumstantial evidence charge).
51. See, e.g., Murray v. State, 462 S.W.2d 438, 442-43 (Ark. 1971) (when correct instruction given on reasonable doubt, refusal to give circumstantial evidence instruction not
error); State v. Wilkins, 523 P.2d 728, 737 (Kan. 1974) (abolished need for circumstantial
evidence charge when jury properly instructed on reasonable doubt); State v. Turnipseed,
297 N.W.2d 308, 312-13 (Minn. 1980) (followed Holland).
52. 646 S.W.2d 191, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (Opinion on State's Motion for
Rehearing).
53. See id.at 192. There was confusion over evidentiary classification of facts
presented at trial. Compare Appellant's Amended Brief at 3, Hankins v. State, 646 S.W.2d
191 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (Opinion on State's Motion for Rehearing) (circumstantial evidence instruction needed when no eyewitnesses) with Brief for Appellee at 16, Hankins v.
State, 646 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (Opinion on State's Motion for Rehearing)
(direct evidence of main fact present and close juxtaposition rule also applied). These arguments highlight the problem that there may be disagreement whether particular evidence is
direct or circumstantial, and if circumstantial, whether it may be so closely related to the
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Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial court had properly
refused to give the circumstantial evidence instruction.5 4 The court held
that such a charge was improper and unnecessary when the jury had been
properly instructed on the reasonable doubt standard. 5 The court reasoned that the circumstantial evidence charge "was inherently confusing to
a jury by suggesting that a different burden of proof than the reasonable
doubt standard applies in circumstantial evidence cases." 56
Judge Miller, in his concurring and dissenting opinion, agreed that the
circumstantial evidence charge was confusing, but argued that the court
had not gone far enough to remedy the jurors' confusion.5 7 He would require the court to give a definition of reasonable doubt similar to that
given in the federal courts in jury instructions on the standard of proof.5 8
In a separate dissent, Judge Onion believed the court should continue to
allow the circumstantial evidence instruction as a protection against juror

main fact that it is considered equivalent to direct. See Brief for Appellee at 16, Hankins v.
State, 646 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (Opinion on State's Motion for Rehearing).
54. See Hankins v. State, 646 S.W.2d 191, 200 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (Opinion on
State's Motion for Rehearing).
55. See id at 197.
56. Id at 199 n.I. The court emphasized that the section of the charge requiring circumstances to "exclude, to a moral certainty, every other reasonable hypothesis except the
defendant's guilt" was the part that implied a standard of proof different from "beyond a
reasonable doubt." See id at 200. Psychological research supports the reasoning in Hankins that the circumstantial evidence charge incorrectly implies a different standard of
proof. See Kerr, Atkin, Stasser, Meek, Holt, & Davis, Guilt Beyond 4 Reasonable Doubt:
Effects of Concept Definition andAssigned Decision Rule on the Judgments of Mock Jurors, 34
J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCH. 282, 282 (1976). The stringent instructions under which more guilty
verdicts were rendered are very similar to those found in the circumstantial evidence instruction. Compare id at 286 ("[To a moral certainty ...[i]f you feel that the facts . . are
compatible with any other theory besides the one in which the defendant is guilty; then you
have a reasonable doubt .. ")with P. MCCLUNG, JURY CHARGES FOR TEXAS CRIMINAL
PRACTICE 260 (198 1) ("[Circumstances] must exclude, to a moral certainty, every other reasonable hypothesis except the defendant's guilt .. ").
57. See Hankins v. State, 646 S.W.2d 191, 203 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (Opinion on
State's Motion for Rehearing) (Miller, J., concurring and dissenting). Judge Miller recommended "perspective coupled with definition." See id at 203 n.6 (Miller, J., concurring and
dissenting). He stated that a juror may understand how sure he must be to convict by hearing a definition of proof by preponderance of the evidence, proof by clear and convincing
evidence, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See id at 203 n.6 (Miller, J., concurring
and dissenting). The juror may see the progression as the standard becomes more stringent
and thereby gain a clearer perspective on how certain he must be to convict. See id at 203
n.6 (Miller, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
58. See id at 203 (Miller, J., concurring and dissenting). The "hesitate to act" definition substantially states that a reasonable doubt is one that would make a reasonable person
hesitate to act in his important personal affairs. See id at 201 (Miller, J., concurring and
dissenting).
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speculation,59 since different inferential processes are required for direct
and circumstantial evidence.6" Additionally, Judge Onion would have upheld the traditional Texas position that a definition of reasonable doubt
should not be given because it does not alleviate juror confusion. 6'
2.

Implications of Hankins

Judge Miller's challenging dissent focused on the major implication of
the Hankins decision. 62 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals clearly has
abolished the requiremenI for a circumstantial evidence instruction "where
the jury is properly instructed on the reasonable doubt standard of
proof."6 3 The following argument is raised that the Hankins holding abolishes the circumstantial evidence instruction altogether. In every criminal
trial the judge is required to instruct the jury on the law.' The law states
that each element of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. 65 The logical conclusion, therefore, is that the judge must instruct
the jury on the reasonable doubt standard which is the law. 6 6 The phrase
"where the jury is properly instructed on the standards for reasonable

59. See id at 217 (Onion, J., dissenting). Judge Onion criticized the majority for leaving no guidance for a test for sufficiency of the evidence in a case relying entirely on circumstantial evidence since the court has abolished the requirement for a circumstantial evidence
charge. See id at 217 (Onion, J., dissenting).
60. See id at 215 (Onion, J., dissenting).
61. See id at 208-09 (Onion, J., dissenting). Judge Clinton's dissent also emphasized
that Texas courts traditionally have held that the usual charge on the reasonable doubt
standard did not remedy an omission of the circumstantial evidence charge. See id at 217
(Clinton, J., dissenting). He noted that the majority had failed to change the usual charge on
reasonable doubt, leaving the jury with no guidance. See id at 219 (Clinton, J., dissenting).
Judge Teague's dissent echoed Judge Clinton's concerns and lamented the potential chaos in
the appellate courts due to the majority's unanswered question of which standard of review
to apply. See id at 220 (Teague, J., dissenting).
62. See Hankins v. State, 646 S.W.2d 191, 203 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (Opinion on
State's Motion for Rehearing) (Miller, J., concurring and dissenting) (definition of reasonable doubt needed).
63. Id. at 200.
64. See TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.14 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
65. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
66. See Schneider v. United States, 192 F.2d 498, 503 (9th Cir. 1951) (error for court
not to properly instruct on reasonable doubt), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 914 (1952); 1 E. DEVTT
& C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE & INSTRUCTIONS § 8.02, at 245 (3d ed. 1977)
(judge required to instruct jury on all essential matters of law, including reasonable doubt);
see also Dauer v. United States, 189 F.2d 343, 344-45 (10th Cir.) (judge required to instruct
jury on critical matters of law), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 898 (1951); Todorow v. United States,
173 F.2d 439, 445 (9th Cir.) (jury must be instructed on law applicable to important fact
issues), cert. denied 337 U.S. 925 (1949).
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doubt,"67 however, gives the illusion that an instruction on reasonable
doubt is optional. Since the court is logically required to give a reasonable
doubt instruction,68 it should be considered mandatory. In contrast, the
wording of Hankins suggests that the circumstantial evidence charge is optional69 and this contention is supported by the lack of a legal or logical
requirement. There is no choice between a mandatory reasonable doubt
instruction and an optional circumstantial evidence charge.7" The wording and logic of the Hankins holding, therefore, not only abolish the requirement
for a circumstantial evidence instruction, but also foreclose its
7
use.

1

An important extrapolation from the Hankins holding concerns the potential for fundamental error7 2 if a circumstantial evidence charge is given
in the future.7 3 In upholding the trial court's refusal to give the instruction
and the defendant's subsequent conviction, the court suggests that the defendant was not harmed and that he received a fair trial.7 4 If a future jury
convicts a defendant after receiving a circumstantial evidence charge the
jury might incorrectly apply a standard of proof different from the consti-

67. See Hankins v. State, 646 S.W.2d 191, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (Opinion on
State's Motion for Rehearing) (emphasis added).
68. Cf. Dauer v. United States, 189 F.2d 343, 344-45 (10th Cir.) (judge must charge jury
on essential matters of law), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 898 (1951).
69. See Hankins v. State, 646 S.W.2d 191, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (Opinion on
State's Motion for Rehearing) (charge improper "where jury. . . properly instructed on...
reasonable doubt").
70. Cf. Schneider v. United States, 192 F.2d 498, 503 (9th Cir. 1951) (error for judge to
improperly instruct on reasonable doubt), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 914 (1952); 1 E. DEVITr &
C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE & INSTRUCTIONS § 8.02, at 245 (3d ed. 1977)
(court must charge jury on all critical issues of law, including reasonable doubt).
71. See Hankins v. State, 646 S.W.2d 191, 199 n.1 (majority explicitly states charge
abolished).
72. See Gooden v. State, 576 S.W.2d 382, 383 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (fundamental
error harms defendant or shows trial not fair and impartial); Ramsey v. Dunlop, 146 Tex.
196, 202, 205 S.W.2d 979, 983 (1947) (fundamental error is "error which directly and ad-

versely affects the interest of the public generally, as that interest is declared in the statutes
or Constitution of this state").
73. See Hankins v. State, 646 S.W.2d 191, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (Opinion on
State's Motion for Rehearing). A circumstantial evidence charge might be given in the future if a court interprets Hankins as merely abolishing the requirement for a circumstantial
evidence instruction, rather than abolishing the charge itself. See id at 197.
74. See id at 200 (trial court correctly denied requested instruction); see also TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.19 (Vernon 1981) (error must harm defendant's rights for
judgment reversal). Judgment reversal is also possible if the record shows that the defendant did not receive a fair trial. See id In addition, counsel must make objections to instructions at trial. See id
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tutionally-mandated standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.75 If
the jury incorrectly applied a more stringent standard, the defendant
would not be harmed because proof had met the constitutional minimum.76 The jury would have been more certain of the defendant's guilt
than necessary and the charge would then be harmless error.77 If the jury
incorrectly applied a lesser standard, however, the defendant would be
harmed because proof had not met the constitutional minimum.7 8 The
resulting harm to the defendant would have been fundamental error requiring automatic reversal.79 The inherent problem in this line of analysis
is that the court can never be certain whether the jury instruction incorrectly implied a lesser or greater standard of proof. The court can only
infer that the charge implied a different standard of proof.8" If a Texas
criminal court gives a circumstantial evidence charge in the future it remains an open question whether appellate courts will consider the error
harmless or fundamental. 8 '
While the issue of fundamental error when a circumstantial evidence
charge is given remains unanswered, the focus of the remainder of this
comment returns to the central problem raised in Judge Miller's dissent:
that a "proper instruction" on the reasonable doubt standard should in'
clude a definition of "reasonable doubt."82
In the aftermath of Hankins
Texas has been left with only a reasonable doubt instruction to convey the
75. See Hankins v. State, 646 S.W.2d 191, 199 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (Opinion on

State's Motion for Rehearing) (confusion in standard of proof reason charge abolished).
76. Cf In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (due process clause guarantees elements
of crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt).
77. Cf Hankins v. State, 646 S.W.2d 191, 200 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (Opinion on
State's Motion for Rehearing) (no error in trial court's refusal to give instruction).
78. Cf Young v. State, 648 S.W.2d 2, 3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (reasonable doubt

charge implying lesser standard of proof fundamental error).
79. See Odom & Valdez, A Review of Fundamental Error in Jury Charges in Texas
CriminalCases, 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 749, 749 (1981) (automatic reversal required by Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals when jury instructions have fundamental error).
80. See Hankins v. State, 646 S.W.2d 191, 199 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (Opinion on

State's Motion for Rehearing) (circumstantial evidence charge with implication of different
standard of proof confuses jurors).
81. Cf Richardson v. State, 600 S.W.2d 818, 825 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (fundamental

error in trial court's refusal to permit requested jury instruction on circumstantial evidence);
Young v. State, 648 S.W.2d 2, 3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (reasonable doubt charge that im-

plied lesser standard of proof fundamental error). Probably the court will determine that
the error is fundamental because it cannot really know whether the jury's confusion made
them use a less stringent or a more stringent standard of proof, and since the bias should be
in favor of the defendant's right to a fair trial, the court would most likely assume the de-

fendant was harmed by the jury's confusion on the proper standard of proof. See C. McCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 341, at 798 (2d ed. 1972).
82. See Hankins v. State, 646 S.W.2d 191, 203 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (Opinion on

State's Motion for Rehearing) (Miller, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
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required standard of proof for all criminal cases, but the instruction fails to

define the concept.
III.

3

"BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT"-THE STANDARD OF PROOF IN
CRIMINAL CASES

A. History and Evolution of the Standard
Society, placing a high value on individual life and liberty, has determined that it is better to free a guilty person than to convict an innocent
one.84 To further this ideal the common law has long recognized that a
person may be convicted of a crime only by proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.8 5 In 1970, the United States Supreme Court gave this standard
constitutional stature holding that due process required that each element
of the crime be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.8 6 The Supreme Court
emphasized that the jury must be properly instructed on the reasonable
doubt standard
when it abolished the circumstantial evidence instruction
87
in Holland
B. Most Federal and State Courts Permit Definition of Reasonable Doubt
The United States Supreme Court in Holland considered that a "proper
instruction" on reasonable doubt included a definition broadly termed the
"hesitate to act" definition.8" Reasonable doubt is essentially defined as
83. See Hankins v. State, 646 S.W.2d 191, 208 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (Opinion on
State's Motion for Rehearing) (Onion, J., dissenting) (strong Texas precedent that reasonable doubt not defined).
84. See C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 341, at 798 (2d ed. 1972). Since mistakes will inevitably be made, the law sets a smaller margin for error in criminal cases because the defendant's life or liberty is at stake. See id. at 798.
85. See id. at 799.
86. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 369-72 (1970). The court has been criticized for
giving uncertain criteria for application of the standard, particularly in the area of shifting
the burden of proof. See generally Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 217 (1977) (defendant has burden of proof of affirmative defenses by preponderance of evidence); Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 705 (1975) (affirmative defenses place burden of persuasion on prosecution when element in affirmative defense included in definition of crime); Allen & De
Grazia, The ConstitutionalRequirement of Proof Beyond A Reasonable Doubt in Criminal
Cases.- A Comment Upon Chaos in the Lower Courts, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 1, 3, 10 (1982)
(citing Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 523 (1979) (jury instruction created conclusive
presumption which removed state's burden of proof of each element beyond a reasonable
doubt)).
87. See Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140-41 (1954).
88. See id. at 140 ("hesitate to act" preferable); Hankins v. State, 646 S.W.2d 191, 201
(Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (Opinion on State's Motion for Rehearing) (Miller, J., concurring
and dissenting) ("hesitate to act" definition approved by Holland). The definition is usually
stated as:
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"the kind of doubt that would make a reasonable person hesitate to act
. ..in the most important of his own affairs." 89 The lower federal courts
followed Holland and nine federal circuits now use this instruction. 90
A majority of state courts also permit a definition of reasonable doubt be
given in the jury instruction on the standard of proof.9' Their definitions
take various forms and lack the consistency of the "hesitate to act" definition used by federal courts.92 In California, state courts may hold jury
instructions erroneous when reasonable doubt has not been defined according to their particular definition.93

A reasonable doubt is a doubt based upon reason and common sense-the kind of
doubt that would make a reasonable person hesitate to act. Proof beyond a reasonable
doubt must, therefore, be proof of such a convincing character that a reasonable person
would not hesitate to rely and act upon it in the most important of his own affairs.
1 E. DEVrrr & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE & INSTRUCTIONS § 11.14, at 310
(3d ed. 1977).
89. 1 E. DEVITT & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE & INSTRUCTIONS § 11.14,
at 310 (3d ed. 1977). See, e.g., Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954) (preference for "hesitate to act" definition); United States v. Wilkerson, 691 F.2d 425, 427-28 n.3
(8th Cir. 1982) ("hesitate to act" approved); United States v. Drake, 673 F.2d 15, 20 (1st Cir.
1982) ("hesitate to act" definition sanctioned).
90. See United States v. Wilkerson, 691 F.2d 425, 427-28 n.3 (8th Cir. 1982) ("hesitate
to act" preferred); United States v. Miller, 688 F.2d 652, 662 (9th Cir. 1982) ("hesitate to act"
upheld); United States v. Drake, 673 F.2d 15, 20 (1st Cir. 1982) ("hesitate to act" definition
approved); United States v. Clayton, 643 F.2d 1071, 1075 (5th Cir. 1981) ("hesitate to act"
best explanation); United States v. Magnano, 543 F.2d 431, 436 (2d Cir. 1976) ("hesitate to
act" desirable); United States v. Leaphart, 513 F.2d 747, 750 (10th Cir. 1975) (followed Holland); United States v. Restaino, 369 F.2d 544, 546 (3d Cir. 1966) (Holland definition preferred); United States v. Releford, 352 F.2d 36, 41 (6th Cir. 1965) (followed Holland
"hesitate to act"), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 984 (1966); United States v. Harris, 346 F.2d 182,
184 (4th Cir. 1965) ("hesitate to act" approved).
91. See, e.g., Merritt v. Commonwealth, 386 S.W.2d 727, 729 (Ky. 1965) (substantial
and real doubt); State v. Hester, 246 S.E.2d 83, 84 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978) ("based on reason
and common sense"); State v. Pam, 635 P.2d 766, 768 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981) ("doubt for
which a reason based upon the evidence exists").
92. Compare State v. Murphy, 323 A.2d 561, 565 (R.I. 1974) ("actual substantial doubt
of a defendant's guilt arising from the evidence or want thereof as distinguished from a mere
suspicion or apprehension or imaginary doubt") with State v. Poulin, 277 A.2d 493, 496 (Me.
1971) ("doubt. . .for which some good reason may be given").
93. See, e.g., People v. Simpson, 275 P.2d 31, 38 (Cal. 1954) ("reasonable doubt...
means a doubt which has some good reason for its existence arising out of evidence in the
case; such doubt as you are able to find a reason for in the evidence .. .an actual and
substantial doubt growing out of the unsatisfactory nature of the evidence"); People v.
Smith, 129 P. 785, 791 (Cal. 1913) ("A doubt to justify an acquittal must be reasonable, and
it must arise from a candid and impartial investigation of all the evidence in the case");
People v. Huntington, 70 P. 284, 285 (Cal. 1903) ("Moral certainty is described as a state of
impression produced by facts in which a reasonable mind feels a sort of coercion or necessity
to act in accordance with it.").
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Texas Does Not Use Definition of Reasonable Doubt

In Texas a long history of cases states that "reasonable doubt" should
not be defined.9 4 While the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides
that "[all persons are presumed to be innocent and no person may be
convicted of an offense unless each element of the offense is proved be-

yond a reasonable doubt,"95 it does not define reasonable doubt.9 6 The

Texas Penal Code9 7 echoes the requirements of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, but also does not define reasonable doubt. 98 The Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals, however, has recently emphasized its disapproval of a definition of beyond a reasonable doubt but left the door open
for a jury instruction defining reasonable doubt.99 The Texas jury instruction on the presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt standard usually takes the form:
All persons are presumed to be innocent and no person may be convicted of an offense unless each element of the offense is proved by the
State beyond a reasonable doubt. The fact that a person has been
arrested, confined, or indicted for, or otherwise charged with, the offense gives rise to no inference of guilt at his trial. In case you have a
reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt after considering all the evidence before you, and these instructions, you will acquit him."°°

94. See, e.g., Pigg v. State, 162 Tex. Crim. 521, 523, 287 S.W.2d 673, 674 (1956) (reasonable doubt needs no definition); Bennett v. State, 91 Tex. Crim. 422, 424, 239 S.W. 951, 952
(1922) (reasonable doubt definition unnecessary); Massey v. State, 1 Tex. Ct. App. 563, 570
(1877) (reasonable doubt needs no definition to people with common sense). In contrast,
Texas allows a definition of the two other standards or proof: by preponderance of the
evidence and by clear and convincing evidence. Compare Hankins v. State, 646 S.W.2d 191,
203 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (Opinion on State's Motion for Rehearing) (Miller, J., concurring and dissenting) (Texas permits definition of preponderance of the evidence) and
Dallas Cotton Mills v. Ashley, 63 S.W. 160, 161 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901, writ dism'd) (specific
definition of preponderance of the evidence given was incorrect, not giving definition per se)
with State v. Addington, 588 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. 1979) (clear and convincing evidence

defined as firm belief concerning truth of allegation).
95. TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.

art. 38.03 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).

96. See id art. 3.01 (Vernon 1977) (words in code have ordinary meaning unless specific definition given).
97. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 2.01 (Vernon 1974) (presumption of innocence unless guilty of each element beyond a reasonable doubt).
98. See id § 1.07 (Vernon 1974) (definitions do not include "reasonable doubt").
99. See Young v. State, 648 S.W.2d 2, 3-4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (Onion, J., concurring). Judge Onion, in a concurring opinion, stated that "[w]hile a charge defining reasonable doubt may pass muster, this court does not condone the giving of such a charge." Id at
3-4 (Onion, J., concurring). But see id.at 4-5 (Miller, J., dissenting) (argues strongly for
"hesitate to act" definition used in federal courts).
100. P. MCCLUNG, JURY CHARGES FOR TEXAS CRIMINAL PRACTICE 310 (1981).
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LEGAL SCHOLARS AND JUDGES DEMAND CLEAR AND ACCURATE
EXPLANATION OF REASONABLE DOUBT WHICH JURORS CAN
UNDERSTAND

The United States Supreme Court has stated that the function of a jury
instruction is to focus juror attention on concepts which must be understood.'' Once juror attention has been focused, the more difficult task is a
clear and correct explanation of the concept in terms a juror can understand.' ° 2 Jurors often have difficulty understanding instructions because
10 3
of unfamiliarity with words used in their particular legal connotation.
A jury instruction on the reasonable doubt standard must not only state
the law" but convey it in a format that tells a juror how certain he actually must be in order to convict a person. 0 5 Since a juror bases his degree
of certainty on his own experience and knowledge,'0 6 commentators lament the lack of guidance in explaining the standard in terms which can be
understood and applied in a uniform manner by jurors with diverse backgrounds. 0 7 Although divided over the issue, the judiciary has also voiced
concern with the lack of a clear explanation of reasonable doubt that a

101. See Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 340 (1978) (function of jury instruction to
direct juror attention to issues that must be understood); see also Doyle v. State, 631 S.W.2d
732, 737 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (On Rehearing) (judge required to apply law to facts injury
charge).
102. See McBaine, Burden of Proof.- Degrees of Belie/ 32 CAL. L. REV. 242, 244 (1944)
(correct jury instruction difficult task).
103. See Severance & Loftus, Improving the Ability of Jurors to Comprehend and Apply
Criminal Jury Instructions, 17 LAw & Soc. REV. 153, 153 (1982) (syntax and presentation
format also affect comprehension).
104. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.14 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) (in all

felony and misdemeanor cases with jury, trial judge must charge jury with the law). All
issues in criminal trials have been affected by the United States Supreme Court holding in In
re Winship that the Constitution mandated each element of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See Allen & De Grazia, The Constitutional Requirement of Proof
Beyond Reasonable Doubt in Criminal Cases.- A Comment Upon Incipient Chaos in the Lower
Courts, 20 AM. CIuM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1982); see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970)
(due process requires each element of crime be proved beyond a reasonable doubt).
105. See McBaine, Burden of Proof. Degrees of Belief, 32 CAL. L. REV. 242, 251 (1944)
(no consensus on best method of jury instruction).
106. See id at 246-47. Juror experience and knowledge may form three classes to categorize the probability of an event: "what (a) probably has happened, or (b) what highly
probably has happened, or (c) what almost certainly has happened." See id at 246-47.
107. See id at 247-48 (jury instructions on burden of proof do not convey degree of
certainty necessary). Juries must be given clear guidance. See id at 248. Confusing rhetoric
such as "moral certainty" and "abiding conviction" must be avoided. See id at 258. The
judge must explain to the jury how it should apply the reasonable doubt standard. See
Note, The Circumstantial Evidence Charge in Texas Criminal Cases- A Retrograde Doctrine,
55 TEXAs L. REV. 1255, 1278 (1977) (judge required to instruct jury on application of standard); see also Comment, Memory, Magic, and Myth." The Timing of Jury Instructions, 59
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jury can understand.' s Judicial interpretation of the degree of certainty
necessary for the reasonable doubt standard has been reported to be a .90
criterion level; in other words, a nine out of ten chance that the defendant
is guilty.' 9 Whether the judicial interpretation comports with juror comprehension remains unanswered.
Juror comprehension is not the only factor to be considered in formulation of a proper definition of reasonable doubt." 0 The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals has emphasized that precision must be used in jury instructions."' A lack of precision is a basis for reversible error." 2 If the
judge does not precisely and properly state the law, the charge will either
be prejudicial to the defendant and reversible, or allow a defendant to be
acquitted on erroneous grounds.1 3 Due to the requirement for legal precision and the effect of appellate reversal, jury instructions have evolved into
"convoluted sentence structure, legal jargon, and uncommon words."'114
Although the task of reformulating a legally-precise and understandable
instruction is not easy, the legal profession must not settle for less than the
best possible solution.15

OR. L. REV. 451, 452 (1981) (jury system survival demands reforms improving juror decision-making ability).
108. Compare Hankins v. State, 646 S.W.2d 191, 201 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (Opinion
on State's Motion for Rehearing) (Miller, J., concurring and dissenting) (jurors need reasonable doubt explained simply, yet completely) with Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304, 312
(1880) (explanations of reasonable doubt do not clarify concept for jurors) and Hankins v.
State, 646 S.W.2d 191, 208 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (Opinion on State's Motion for Rehearing) (Onion, J., dissenting) (Texas traditionally refused reasonable doubt definition). Judge
Miller pointed out, however, that the consensus outside of Texas is that reasonable doubt
requires clarification and is not self-explanatory. See Young v. State, 648 S.W.2d 2, 4 n.2
(Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (Miller, J., dissenting).
109. See Champagne & Nagel, The Psychology of Judging, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
THE COURTROOM 279 (N. Kerr & R. Bray 1982) (when questioned by researchers, judges
frequently report "beyond a reasonable doubt" means 90% certain).
110. See Severance & Loftus, Improving the Ability of Jurors to ComprehendandApply
CriminalJury Instructions, 17 LAW & Soc. REV. 153, 154 (1982) (accurate statement of law
required). Reversal results on appeal if a judge has misstated the law. See id at 154.
111. See Galvan v. State, 598 S.W.2d 624, 630-31 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (phrase "and
no other person" omitted from standard instruction held reversible error).
112. See id.at 630-31.
113. See McBaine, Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 CAL. L. REV. 242, 256-57
(1944).
114. Severance & Loftus, Improving the Ability of Jurors to Comprehend and Apply
CriminalJury Instructions, 17 LAW & Soc. REV. 153, 154 (1982) (jurors never seem to really
understand instructions).
115. See McBaine, Burden ofProof: Degrees ofBelief, 32 CAL. L. REV. 242, 258 (1944)
(though language and vocabulary impose limitations, best solution must be sought).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

19

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 15 [2022], No. 2, Art. 4

ST MARY'S LAW JOURNAL
V.

[Vol. 15:353

PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES ON JUROR COMPREHENSION OF
DIFFERENT DEFINITIONS OF REASONABLE DOUBT

An interdisciplinary approach is often helpful in the solution to
problems involving complex human behavior. Psychological studies on
juror behavior provide guidance in the search for a comprehensible definition of reasonable doubt.' 16 Studies in the fields of psychology and
psycholinguistics have focused on many aspects of juror behavior" 7 including the effect of jury instructions on juror comprehension. " 8 Psycholinguists have demonstrated that jury instructions contain many features
difficult to comprehend; including unusual or archaic phrases, many negations, and complex sentence structure." 9 In order to discover a more simple, yet accurate means to convey the concept of reasonable doubt to
jurors, psychologists have examined various definitions of reasonable
doubt.' 2 ° Two major experiments will be discussed which both indicate
116. See Kerr, Atkin, Stasser, Meek, Holt, & Davis, Guilt Beyonda Reasonable Doubt.Effects of Concept Definition andAssignedDecision Rule on the Judgments of Mock Jurors, 34
J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCH. 282, 292 (1976) (meaning of reasonable doubt not apparent to college student mock jurors); Severance & Loftus, Improving the Ability of Jurors to Comprehend and Apply CriminalJury Instructions, 17 LAW & Soc. REV. 153, 194 (1982) (research
shows psycholinguistic changes in jury charges aided comprehension). For an extensive
treatment on a variety of psychological studies, see generally THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE
COURTROOM (N. Kerr & R. Bray 1982) (psychological studies on juror behavior).
117. See, e.g., Kaplan, Cognitive Processesin the IndividualJuror, in THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF THE COURTROOM 199 (N. Kerr & R. Bray 1982) (judgment formation process); Penrod,
Loftus & Winkler, The Reliability of Eyewitness Testimony.- A PsychologicalPerspective, in
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM 156 (N. Kerr & R. Bray 1982) (juror difficulty in
discriminating correct from incorrect eyewitness testimony); Stasser, Kerr & Bray, The Social Psychology of Jury Deliberations. Structure,Process, andProduct in THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF THE COURTROOM 253 (N. Kerr & R. Bray 1982) (jury decision-making process).
118. See, e.g., Kerr, Atkin, Stasser, Meek, Holt, & Davis, Guilt Beyond a Reasonable
Doubt. Effects of Concept Definition andAssigned Decision Rule on the Judgments of Mock
Jurors, 34 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCH. 282, 282 (1976) (juror verdicts significantly affected by
differences in reasonable doubt definitions); Lind, The Psychology of Courtroom Procedure
in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM 29 (N. Kerr & R. Bray 1982) (jury instructions
currently used create juror comprehension problems); Severance & Loftus, Improving the
Ability of Jurorsto Comprehend andApply CriminalJury Instructions, 17 LAW & Soc. REV.
153, 153 (1982) (juror comprehension improved by psycholinguistically and legally correct
instructions).
119. See Lind, The Psychology of Courtroom Procedure, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE
COURTROOM 28 (N. Kerr & R. Bray 1982). See generally A. ELWORK, B. SALES, J. ALFINI,
MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE § 7, at 145-88 (1982) (proposed method
for re-writing jury instructions).
120. See, e.g., Champagne & Nagel, The Psychology of Judging, in THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF THE COURTROOM 279 (N. Kerr & R. Bray 1982) ("10 to I trade-off"); Kerr, Atkin,
Stasser, Meek, Holt, & Davis, Guilt Beyond a ReasonableDoubt Effects of Concept Definition
andAssignedDecision Rule on the Judgments ofMock Jurors, 34 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCH. 282,
286 (1976) (undefined, lax, and stringent definition); Severance & Loftus, Improving the Abil-
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that definitions of reasonable doubt significantly affect juror comprehension.' 2 1 The research supports the position that Texas should include a
definition of reasonable doubt in its charge to the jury.
A.

The Severance and Loftus Study

Researchers Severance and Loftus in a unique interdisciplinary approach, examined concepts which confused jurors, including reasonable
doubt and intent.'22 Pattern instructions were changed according to
psycholinguistic principles, 23 submitted to judges for approval of legal aciy of Jurorsto Comprehendand Apply CriminalJury Instructions, 17 LAW & Soc. REV. 153,
191 (1982) (revised pattern jury instructions). A major drawback in making conclusions
about actual jurors from results of experiments is that experiments used mock jurors with a
simulated trial videotape, whereas actual jurors are in a courtroom setting and actually deliberate the fate of another human being. See Kerr, Atkin, Stasser, Meek, Holt, & Davis,
Guilt Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: Effects of Concept Definition and Assigned Decision Rule
on the Judgments ofMock Jurors, 34 J. PERS. & Soc. PSYCH. 282, 291 (1976) (results considered suggestive rather than conclusive). Experimental results, however, are useful indicators
that suggest actual juror behavior. See id at 291.
121. See Kerr, Atkin, Stasser, Meek, Holt, & Davis, Guilt Beyond a Reasonable Doubt:
Effects of Concept Definition andAssigned Decision Rule on the Judgments ofMock Jurors, 34
J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCH. 282, 282 (1976) (individual and group decisions affected); Severance

& Loftus, Improving the Ability of Jurors to Comprehend and Apply Criminal Jury Instructions, 17 LAw & Soc. REV. 153, 194 (1982) (juror comprehension aided by improved instructions). In addition, since juror decisions are made both individually and as a group, the
group decision-making process compounds individual juror misunderstanding of the reasonable doubt standard. See Kerr, Atkin, Stasser, Meek, Holt, & Davis, Guilt Beyonda Reasonable Doubt: Effects of Concept Definition and Assigned Decision Rule on the Judgments of
Mock Jurors, 34 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCH. 282, 282 (1976) (group consensus for degree of
certainty). While this comment focuses on overall juror comprehension, the distinction between individual and group decision-making must be kept in mind. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 363 (1972) (judicial recognition reasonable doubt is decision-making
criterion).
122. See Severance & Loftus, Improving the Ability of Jurorsto Comprehend andApply
CriminalJury Instructions, 17 LAW & Soc. REV. 153, 161 (1982). Actual queries submitted
by jurors during deliberation at criminal trials for a one-year period were analyzed and
issues with critical legal significance most frequently questioned were used in the experiment. See id at 166-70. Jurors frequently requested clarification of reasonable doubt. See
id at 168. Other research indicates that most jurors understand merely half of their instructions. See id at 160.
123. See id. at 157-58. Changes were made in words used, sentence structure, and concept organization. See id at 157. Uncommon, abstract words, or those with two meanings
(such as respect) were replaced by familiar concrete words. See id. at 158. Imbedded or
compound sentences and the passive voice were changed to simple active-voice sentences.
See id at 158. Concepts were reorganized by breaking down a complex structure into simple components, then integrating them. See id at 158. An alternate concept organization
structure requires ordered idea presentation so that comprehension of an idea flows from
comprehension of the preceding ideas. See id at 158. Additional changes included the
insertion of explanatory phrases (for example, which is . . .), replacement of nominaliza-
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curacy,124 then presented to mock jurors. 125 In one phase of the experiment the standard pattern definition of reasonable doubt significantly
improved comprehension compared with a group which only received general jury instructions. 26 In the next phase of the experiment revised instructions were presented to the mock jurors.' 2 7 While the revised
instructions for reasonable doubt produced no improvement in comprehension, the revised instructions for intent did improve juror comprehen-

tions with verbs (for example, "we did" for "the doing of'), reduction of lists to two items,
and use of directives to concentrate juror attention (for example, must, may). See id at 15960.
124. See id at 161. Legal precision is necessary for instructions to pass appellate scrutiny. See id at 184.
125. See id at 176. Mock jurors watched a videotaped burglary trial. Compare Severance & Loftus, Improving the Ability of Jurors to Comprehend and Apply Criminal Jury
Instructions, 17 LAW & Soc. REV. 153, 180 (1982) (pattern instructions improved comprehension when jurors saw videotaped trial) with Elwork, Sales & Alfini, Juridic Decisions. In
Ignorance of the Law or in Light of It1 1 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 163 (1977), reprinted in
Severance & Loftus, Improving the Ability ofJurors to Comprehendand Apply CriminalJury
Instructions, 17 LAW & Soc. REV. 153, 158-59 (1982) (pattern instructions did not improve
juror comprehension).
126. See Severance & Loftus, Improving the Ability of Jurors to Comprehend and Apply
Criminal Jury Instructions, 17 LAW & Soc. REV. 153, 180 (1982) (no improvement in ability
to apply instructions although comprehension errors reduced). The experiment used the
Washington state pattern instruction defining reasonable doubt in the following manner:
A reasonable doubt is one for which a reason exists. A reasonable doubt is such a doubt
as would exist in the mind of a reasonable person after fully, fairly and carefully considering all of the evidence or lack of evidence. If, after such consideration, you have
an abiding belief in the truth of the charge, you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id at 171 n.16. Pattern instructions, however, have been criticized as too general and abstract and containing flaws similar to those found in definitions derived from case law because pattern instruction definitions also flow from case law. See id at 156.
127. See id at 185-86. The revised instruction states:
The defendant has entered a plea of not guilty. That plea puts in issue every element of
the crime charged. The defendant is presumed to be innocent and is not required to
prove his or her innocence or any fact. This presumption of innocence is present at the
beginning of the trial and continues unless you decide after hearing all the evidence that
there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty. The state has the
burden of proving each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. A reasonable
doubt about guilt is not a vague or speculative doubt but is a doubt for which a reason
exits. A reasonable doubt is a doubt that would exist in the mind of a reasonable person after that person has fully, fairly and carefully considered all of the evidence or lack
of evidence. If, after such thorough consideration, you believe in the truth of the
charge, you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt. If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that all elements of the charge have been proved, then you must find the
defendant guilty. However, if you are left with a reasonable doubt about the proof of
any element, then you must find the defendant not guilty.
Id at 185-86.
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sion.128 Since there was improvement for one concept, the researchers
suggested that better revised instructions
for reasonable doubt should pro29
duce improved comprehension.
B.

The Kerr, Atkin, et al Study

Another experiment varied reasonable doubt instructions into three
classes: undefined, lax, and stringent. 3 ° The different definitions had a
128. See id at 189. There were fewer guilty verdicts, however, with revised instructions. See id at 189. The group decision-making process also produced fewer guilty verdicts. See id at 189. Other researchers have suggested that judges reject revised instructions
because they make convictions more difficult. See Champagne & Nagel, The Psychology of

Judging, in THE

PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM

280 (N. Kerr & R. Bray 1982).

129. See Severance & Loftus, Improving the Ability of Jurorsto Comprehend and Apply
CriminalJury Instructions, 17 LAW & Soc. REV. 153, 194 (1982). Severance and Loftus also
suggest that misunderstanding evidence may cause part of the juror error. See id at 194.
130. See Kerr, Atkin, Stasser, Meek, Holt, & Davis, Guilt Beyond a Reasonable Doubt.Effects of Concept Definition andAssigned Decision Rule on the Judgments of Mock Jurors, 34
J. PERS. & Soc. PSYCH. 282, 286 (1976). The undefined instruction was as follows:
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, by the law of this state the burden is not upon the
defendant to prove his innocence, but, on the contrary, the burden is on the prosecution
to convince you beyond any reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime
of rape.
Id at 286. The lax instruction was as follows:
You have heard the term reasonable doubt several times here today. A reasonable
doubt is not just a possible doubt, not a capricious or trivial doubt, but a serious and
well-founded misgiving about the defendant's guilt of this crime. Such a doubt must be
based only on the evidence of this case and not upon anything outside of or not included in the evidence. The prosecution does not have to convince you that the defendant is guilty beyond even the possibility of a doubt, nor need they prove that their facts
are absolutely true. Of course, everything that has to be proven with evidence is subject
to some doubt, but just any doubt is not the same thing as a reasonable doubt. A
reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt must be a substantial one, a fair one, one
based on reason, one for which reasons can be given. In summary you need not be
absolutely sure that the defendant is guilty to find him guilty.
Id. at 286. The stringent instruction provided:
The defendant is assumed innocent under the law. To change that presumption of
innocence the prosecution must have convinced you to a moral certainty, with absolute
and positive proof, that the defendant is guilty. That is, before you can return a verdict
of guilty you must be sure and certain that the defendant is guilty. If you are not sure
and certain of his guilt, you must find him not guilty. In reviewing the evidence of the
case, you may be able to form many theories about what might have occurred. One of
those theories of course is that the defendant is guilty, as charged, of the crime of rape.
But you may be able to come up with other explanations of the evidence. If you feel
that the facts of this case are compatible with any other theory besides the one in which
the defendant is guilty, then you have a reasonable doubt about his guilt and must find
him not guilty. In order for such a doubt to qualify as a reasonable doubt it is not
essential for everyone to agree with you. If you feel any such doubt, you must find the
defendant not guilty. If you are certain that you have no such doubt, you should find
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significant effect on both individual and group decisions.' 3 ' Comprehension itself was not measured in this experiment; 13 2 however, the results
indicated that different definitions of reasonable doubt affected the degree
of certainty jurors felt they must have in order to convict. 133 The researchers suggested that a definition of reasonable doubt should be one that explains the correct degree of proof in a simple format readily
comprehensible to jurors both individually and as a group.134 The overall
results of the two experiments suggest that juror comprehension can be
improved by receiving a definition of reasonable doubt carefully tailored
by psycholinguistic techniques and legal principles.' 3 5
VI.

PROPOSED DEFINITION OF REASONABLE DOUBT SHOULD BE
REQUIRED BY TEXAS COURTS

Although the majority on the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals still cautions against dangers in defining reasonable doubt,' 3 6 Judge Miller's position advocating a definition of reasonable doubt is supported by federal
137
state courts, l13 legal commentators, 39 and pscyhological reCourts,

him guilty. In summary, to convince [sic] the defendant, you must believe beyond any
reasonable doubt that he is guilty of the crime of rape as I have defined to you.

Id

at 286.
131. See id at 287 (most guilty verdicts with lax definition).

132. See id at 291 (focus on verdicts and comparison of individual with group
decisions).
133. See id at 291. The definition did not affect juror understanding of the weight of
the evidence because decisions on the probability that the accused committed the offense
were not affected by definitional differences. See id at 291.
134. See id at 292 (group factors also important).
135. See Severance & Loftus, Improving the Ability of Jurors to Comprehendand Apply
CriminalJury Instructions, 17 LAW & Soc. REV. 153, 194 (1982). Careful attention must be
paid to legal precision. See Galvan v. State, 598 S.W.2d 624, 630-31 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
136. See Young v. State, 648 S.W.2d 2, 4-5 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (Miner, J., dissenting) (inherent dangers). The "hesitate to act" definition was at issue in this case, but the
majority avoided the issue by holding that the entire jury charge was defective due to a
phrase concerning "an abiding belief' which implied a lower standard of proof. See id at 4.
137. See, e.g., United States v. Wilkerson, 691 F.2d 425, 427-28 n.3 (8th Cir. 1982)
(defined reasonable doubt according to "hesitate to act" definition); United States v. Drake,
673 F.2d 15, 20 (Ist Cir. 1982) (preference for "hesitate to act" definition); United States v.
Breedlove, 576 F.2d 57, 58 n.1 (5th Cir. 1978) (reasonable doubt based on reason and common sense).
138. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 152 N.W.2d 426, 431 (Iowa 1967) (approved correct
definition of reasonable doubt); State v. Henderson, 547 S.W.2d 141, 143 (Mo. Ct. App.
1976) ("reasonable doubt does not mean beyond a shadow"); Hardin v. State, 355 S.W.2d
105, 108 (Tenn. 1962) (uncertainty concerning guilt produces reasonable doubt).
139. See McBaine, Burden of Proof Degrees of Belief, 32 CAL. L. REV. 242, 258 (1944)
(need for clear words with common usage); cf. Comment, Memory, Magic, and Myth: The
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search."4 Judge Miller recommends a definition in "substantial compliance" with the "hesitate to act" definition used by Holland and the federal
courts.' 4 1 This comment, applying psycholinguistic principles suggested
by psychological research to the "hesitate to act" definition 42 recommends
the following definition of reasonable doubt be required in Texas criminal
cases:
A reasonable doubt is a doubt based on reason and common sense. It
is the kind of doubt that would make a reasonable person hesitate to
act in the conduct of his or her serious and important business or personal matters. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that will remove from your mind any reasonable doubt, which is the kind of
doubt that would make you hesitate to act in the conduct of your serious and important business or personal matters. If you are satisfied

Timing of Jury Instructions, 59 OR. L. REV. 451, 452 (1981) (reforms needed in jury
instructions).
140. See, e.g., Kerr, Atkin, Stasser, Meek, Holt, & Davis, Guilt Beyond a Reasonable
Doubt. Effects of Concept Definition andAssigned Decision Rule on the Judgments of Mock
Jurors, 34 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCH. 282, 282 (1976) (different definitions affect juror decisions); Lind, The Psychology of CourtroomProcedure, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM 29 (N. Kerr & R. Bray 1982) (jury misunderstanding created by jury charge);
Severance & Loftus, Improving the Ability of Jurorsto Comprehend andApply CriminalJury
Instructions, 17 LAW & Soc. REV. 153, 194 (1982) (comprehension improvement with
definition).
141. See Young v. State, 648 S.W.2d 2,4 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (Miller, J., dissenting) (use of substantial compliance criterion adds support of federal holdings).
142. See Hankins v. State, 646 S.W.2d 191, 201 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (Opinion on
State's Motion for Rehearing) (Miller, J., concurring and dissenting). The first two
sentences are slightly modified portions of the "hesitate to act" definition. Compare United
States v. Burgess, No. 73-1983 (4th Cir. July 3, 1974), reprinted in Hankins v. State, 646
S.W.2d 191, 201 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (Opinion on State's Motion for Rehearing)
(Miller, J., concurring and dissenting) ("A reasonable doubt is a doubt based upon reason
and common sense, the kind of doubt that would make a reasonable person hesitate to act.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt must, therefore, be proof of such a convincing character
that you would be willing to rely and act upon it unhesitatingly in the most important of
your own affairs.") and Hankins v. State, 646 S.W.2d 191, 203 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983)
(Opinion on State's Motion for Rehearing) (Miller, J., concurring and dissenting) (Judge
Miller recommends "[proof beyond a reasonable doubt is... that degree of proof that will
erase in the mind of the jury the kind of doubt that would make a person hesitate to act in
the conduct of their more serious and important personal affairs.") with 1 E. DEVITT & C.
BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE & INSTRUCTIONS § 11.14, at 310 (3d ed. 1977) ("the
kind of doubt that would make a reasonable person hesitate to act ... in the most important of his own affairs"). Sentence three of the definition personalized the definition so that
the juror sees himself or herself as the reasonable person and a reasonable doubt as one that
would make him or her hesitate to act. See Severance & Loftus, Improving the Ability of
Jurorsto Comprehend andApply CriminalJury Instructions, 17 LAW & Soc. REV. 153, 15960 (1982). Sentences four and five are directives essentially derived from experimental research. See id at 185-86.
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beyond a reasonable doubt that all elements of the crime have been
proved, then you must find the defendant guilty. However, if you are
left with a reasonable doubt about the proof of any element, then you
must find the defendant not guilty.
Judge Miller has enthusiastically approved this definition. 4 3 He noted
that this definition conveys the essence of reasonable doubt because "it
tells a juror that if he is as sure that the defendant is guilty as he would be
about doing something really important in his life, then he is convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt as the law requires."'"
If the Court of Criminal Appeals refuses to require such a definition, at
least it should allow judges the discretion to use it.' 45 In addition, this
comment recognizes the value of interdisciplinary input and invites the
146
Texas psychologists to test juror understanding utilizing this definition.
While an experimental test must necessarily be conducted in a simulated
situation and the results are merely suggestive rather than definitive, 147 the
148
ultimate decision rests in the hands of the judiciary or the legislature. 141
VII.

CONCLUSION

The demise of the Texas circumstantial evidence instruction in Hankins
has focused attention and reinforced the need for a proper instruction on
the reasonable doubt standard of proof.' 5 ° In order to properly instruct
the jury, the reasonable doubt charge should include the proposed defini143. Telephone interview with Judge Chuck Miller, Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
(Sept. 30, 1983) (definition as good or better than any he has seen). Judge Miller also welcomed interdisciplinary support from the academic community. Id.
144. Young v. State, 648 S.W.2d 2, 5 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (Miller, J., dissenting).
Judge Miller stated that this quote from Young best described the proper focus of a definition of reasonable doubt. Telephone interview with Judge Chuck Miller, Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals (Sept. 30, 1983).
145. See Young v. State, 648 S.W.2d 2, 5 (Tex. Crim.App. 1983) (Miller, J., dissenting)
(judicial discretion recommended if requirement not imposed).
146. See Severance & Loftus, Improving the Ability ofJurorsto Comprehend andApply
CriminalJury Instructions, 17 LAW & Soc. REV. 153, 184 (1982). A paradigm similar to that
used in phase three of the study should be designed in which jurors view a videotaped trial
situation and receive either no instructions, the reasonable doubt charge currently used in
Texas, or the new instruction containing the reasonable doubt definition. See id.at 184.
147. See Kerr, Atkin, Stasser, Meek, Holt, & Davis, Guilt Beyond a Reasonable Doubt.:
Effects of Concept Definition andAssignedDecision Rule on the Judgmentsof Mock Jurors, 34
J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCH. 282, 291 (1976) (jurors in experiment do not decide fate of actual
persons).
148. See Young v. State, 648 S.W.2d 2, 4 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (Miller, J., dissenting) (rule forbidding definition of reasonable doubt created by judiciary).
149. See McBaine, Burden of/Proof: Degrees of Belief 32 CAL. L. REV. 242, 259 (1944)
(recommends legislation require improved definitions).
150. See Hankins v. State, 646 S.W.2d 191, 200 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (Opinion on
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tion of reasonable doubt which is in substantial compliance with the "hesitate to act" definition and in a format readily understood by jurors.' 5' The
definition should be required, or, at the very least, left to the judge's discretion as a safeguard to assure progress toward attainment of an American
ideal, that an innocent person not be convicted.
State's Motion for Rehearing) (circumstantial evidence instruction improper when jury
"properly instructed on the reasonable doubt standard of proof").
151. See Severance & Loftus, Improving the Ability of Jurors to ComprehendandApply
CriminalJury Instructions, 17 LAw & Soc.

REV.

153, 161 (1982) (interdisciplinary approach

applied psycholinguistic principles complying with legal precision).
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